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JIHAD--THE INVISIBLE WAR: ARE WE PROTECTING OUR FORCES?

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

JIHAD--THE INVISIBLE WAR: ARE WE PROTECTING OUR FORCES?

Since the Vietnam War, terrorism has caused more casualties to U.S. service members than military operations. Terrorism occurs in many different forms. This paper's focus is on the implications of acts of terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists against U.S. military operations. The 1983 Beirut and 1996 Dhahran bombings demonstrate the U.S. military's failure to include force protection as an essential element of operational analysis and planning. The U.S. is in the middle of a Jihad (holy war) waged by militant Islamic fundamentalists targeting those Arab governments that court the West. Understanding the aims of the Islamic fundamentalists is essential to successful military operations in the Middle East. The U.S. Central Command's assessments cited in this paper illustrate the importance for commanders to integrate regional geopolitical issues into operations. Recommendations to improve security for U.S. military personnel include: creating a Joint Force Protection Center to provide operational support to commanders; establishing agreements with host nations to ensure robust force protection measures; training and assigning Force Protection Officers to operational units; and institutionalizing force protection doctrine into the curricula at all formal service schools for officers and enlisted personnel. Finally, force protection measures by themselves are only a deterrent. Commanders must employ forces that are least vulnerable to the threat of terrorism yet accomplish the mission. Commanders should consider the maximum employment of expeditionary forces in operations where the visibility of U.S. forces undermines host governments or promotes Islamic fundamentalism. Continuance of current practice is detrimental to the long-term U.S. security commitments and objectives in the region.

Terrorism represents an undeclared war against the United States Convinced of the futility of challenging our forces directly, some enemies are waging war against us asymmetrically. They use terrorism If we prove ourselves incapable of responding to terrorism, the terrorists will continue to represent a significant threat to us, especially to our servicemen and women deployed overseas.¹

General Wayne Downing, U.S.A. (Ret.)

Since the Vietnam War, terrorism has caused more casualties to U.S. service members than military operations including the Gulf War. The Downing Commission Report concludes that since 1983 over 300 service members have been killed and over 1,000 injured as a result of terrorism waged against the United States². The FBI estimates that 32 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide from 1982 to 1992 were targeted against Americans or American property.³ This invisible war between the militant Islamic fundamentalists and the United States transcends national boundaries and does not lend itself to traditional concepts of warfighting. Lacking a clearly defined enemy, it is difficult to delineate a battlefield in a conventional sense when terrorists retain the initiative to employ deadly force at any point of their choosing.

"Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."⁴ To operate effectively in the Middle East, the U.S. military must understand the source of the militant Islamic fundamentalist fervor and the causes of its emerging popularity. Operational commanders must not underestimate the resolve of these militant groups. Changes in the outlook with which current operations are planned and executed are required. To deter militant Islamic fundamentalists, the U.S. military needs to better organize by providing the commander a specialized unit for the protection of the main force. To enhance the commander's ability to protect his force, binding agreements with host nations that allow robust force protection measures must be achieved. To support operational units in force protection operations, a Joint Force Protection Center must be established. Lastly, force protection measures alone are only a

deterrent. Commanders must employ forces that are the least vulnerable to the threat of terrorism yet accomplish the mission. Commanders should consider the maximum employment of expeditionary forces in operations where the visibility of U.S. forces undermines host governments, promotes Islamic fundamentalism, and is detrimental to the long-term U.S. security commitments and objectives.

Following the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, joint doctrinal publications and service manuals related to force protection were published. However, the U.S. failed to learn the harsh lessons from this tragedy. The recent U.S. Air Force barracks bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia suggests significant institutional complacency within the Department of Defense which prevents effective implementation of necessary force protection doctrine into training and operations. As the vanguard of our national security strategy, U.S. forward deployed forces are under increasing threat from militant Islamic fundamentalists. A review of the terrorist incidents involving militant Islamic fundamentalist groups suggests that there is a Jihad (holy war) being waged upon the United States military.

NATURE OF THE THREAT

Islam means submission to God. It is the second largest and the fastest growing religion both in the U.S. and the world with an estimated following of over one billion people.⁵ Islamic fundamentalists abhor and mistrust the special relationship between the U.S. and the governments of Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf States. Much of the resentment and anger comes from the political and financial support that the U.S. gives to these governments. Viewed by their discontented citizens as surrogates of the West or the supporters of the Zionist movement, these governments are loudly proclaimed to be enemies of Islam, because of their desires to transpose

Western ideology and values onto those as already prescribed by God through the Quran. The militant Islamic fundamentalist's ideology repudiates Western political and social structures in support of a society that is governed by the tenants of Islam. They zealously believe that Islam provides stronger values and social fabric that can bond a society more closely than the corrupt and diluted values associated with the Western culture.

Nothing in the published version of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) alleviates these beliefs. The principal aims of the U.S. for the Middle East are to maintain the security of Israel and Arab friends and to preserve the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. Due to Iraqi and Iranian hegemonic desires, the U.S. deploys and maintains forces in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. However, the continued presence of U.S. forces in this region perpetuates the image of U.S. imperialism and subjugation, and provokes nationalist backlash often carried out in the name of God. Belief in God is a powerful force that compels man to act like no other.

Islamic fundamentalism continues to entrench itself firmly as an integral part of society in the Middle East where countries lack democratic institutions and tolerate human rights violations. The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Group of Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, and Movement for Islamic Change of Saudi Arabia are a small sampling of the numerous growing movements that have spread throughout the Muslim world. The United States and the Arab governments have been unable to develop a geopolitical strategy to deal effectively with Islamic fundamentalists and the clash of cultures. As a result, militant elements within the Islamic fundamentalists which believe in violence as an expeditious means to attain their ideological goals, have gained momentum. Unlike the established terrorist groups of the past with predictable objectives, this new breed of Islamic terrorists have irreconcilable aims. They target states that provide support to the regimes they oppose; and institutions that represent the source of Western

ideals, such as embassies, military installations, and cultural and financial centers.⁶ Most notably, the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria has been responsible for the deaths of over sixty thousand Algerians since 1992.

OPERATIONAL SETTING

Islam has emerged as the ideological rallying point against local and foreign governments tolerating Western cultural values. While Islamic fundamentalism continues to attract increasing support, the U.S. military forces representing the source of American power remain a high value target. Recently, the Movement for Islamic Change demanded the release of Muslim militants being held in connection with the Dhahran bombing. This group also seeks the release of Salman Al-Awdah, a Muslim cleric jailed for his sermons against the presence of Western forces. They threatened to attack U.S. forces and gave the Saudi authorities until the end of the holy month of Ramadan (mid-February 1997) to free the militants.⁷

Our visible presence in Saudi Arabia undermines the monarchy, fuels Islamic fundamentalism, and is detrimental to our long-term security commitments and objectives. With Islamic fundamentalist's ideology providing the bond, regional differences become irrelevant. Iran and Iraq are vehemently opposed to the U.S. If Saudi Arabia yields to Islamic fundamentalism, as did the Shah of Iran, the potential exists for an alliance forged between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and others against the West. The consequences to U.S. national security and global strategic and geopolitical balance would be far reaching. With the Iranian Revolution as a backdrop and the recent surge by militant Islamic fundamentalists, one should not underestimate their strategic capability or potential.

Despite the overarching threat, the U.S. military must continue to perform its missions in a politically fluid and emotionally charged region dominated by the asymmetrical threat of terrorism. When U.S. forces are employed, it is a paradox of the tremendous U.S. military power. U.S. forces become more exposed to terrorism because the superior military capability encourages the enemy to adopt terrorism as a means to countering the U.S. military. Therefore, force protection becomes essential in attaining operational objectives.

To some, the similarities between the 1983 Beirut and 1996 Dhahran bombings illustrate that the U.S. failed to adopt measures based on the Beirut incident. In both instances terrorists successfully attacked other local targets prior to the barracks bombings. In Beirut, a car-bomb destroyed the U.S. embassy killing 86 and wounding 100. Over a decade later, terrorists attacked the U.S. Office of the Program Manager, Saudi National Guard (OPM SANG), Riyadh, killing 7 and wounding over 60. In both 1983 and 1996, intelligence sources warned the respective commanders that another terrorist attack was likely. Remarkably, the terrorists succeeded in attacking a similar target in both Beirut and Dhahran--U.S. military barracks.

General Binford Peay, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCENT), disagrees that the Beirut and Dhahran bombings are similar. During testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he stated:

Though some have attempted to compare the Khobar Towers bombing with the suicide attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, the differences are striking . . . Saudi Arabia is a prosperous, stable country. It is not in the grips of civil war . . . It is not caught in the middle of conflict between warring nations, as was Lebanon with respect to Syria, Iran, and Israel. U.S. forces are not engaged in active combat operations against local military groups . . .⁸

CINCENT's assessment fails to consider several important issues. Although U.S. forces are invited by the Saudi government and are vital to regional security, to some they are viewed as

an occupation force. The effects of large U.S. forces creates cultural irritants that enable Islamic fundamentalists to garner local support. Then Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, stated, "The depth of feeling among strongly conservative Saudi elements that opposed inviting Western forces to the Kingdom in 1990 and remained opposed to our continued presence was slow to emerge clearly. There was evidence of anti-regime activity and a rise in anonymous threats against American interests, especially following the additional troop deployment in October 1994."⁹

Lacking any democracy in the region for purposes of comparison, CINCCENT incorrectly assumed that the kingdom is a stable country. Relative to its neighbor states, Saudi Arabia appears stable and works hard to preserve the veneer of stability. In fact, it is an increasingly unstable society. In the opinion of many regional experts, Saudi Arabia is entering a period of severe political turmoil. The signs of opposition are especially prevalent amongst the depressed Saudi Shia population. "To the alarm of the authorities, the Ashura [Shia] processions turned into pro-Khomeini demonstrations in eight important towns of the oil region But sporadic demonstrations and pitched battles between government forces and Shia militants continued for about two months, and led to the death of fifty-seven security personnel and ninety-nine Shias. About 6,000 people were arrested."¹⁰ Although these demonstrations occurred in 1979, yearly demonstrations by the Saudi Shias continue. It is well known that insurgencies do not happen overnight. The majority of the regional population are transnational migrants. Annually, several million pilgrims travel to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Hence, Saudi borders are easily penetrated by political and ideological subversion. Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. remain vigilant in order to prevent yet another Ayatollah.

Finally, CINCCENT fails to consider the regional implications of Saudi Arabia's invitation to U.S. forces to operate within its boundaries against Iraq and, indirectly, against Iran. However, Dr. Perry fully understood these implications. During his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he observed: "Certainly [U.S. presence] is opposed by Iraq and Iran, since our forces in the region deter them from actions they might otherwise take. And our very presence in Saudi Arabia is opposed by some religious extremists in that country, some of whom are willing to use violent measures to drive us out."¹¹

OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS

In light of the U.S. military's global responsibilities, ample relevant directives, doctrine, and manuals pertaining to force protection exist within all levels of the Department of Defense. However, due to the inadequacy of terrorism training and education within the U.S. military, publications such as Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism, have not been integrated as an essential element of operational analysis and planning. The Downing Commission observed that, "The Commander, 440th Wing (Provisional) did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack Overall, the orientation and training of personnel was inadequate for the environment in which they were operating."¹² This finding is significant. The military's institutional memory loss and the failure to implement a robust force protection program after the Beirut bombing, contributed to the lack of individual and unit awareness and resulted in poor force protection measures in Saudi Arabia. As a solution, the Downing Commission recommends that "the key to an effective antiterrorism program is to develop an awareness that is both sustained and expanded as the service member progresses from initial entry to termination of military career"¹³

The U.S. military has taken tentative steps toward establishing an institutionalized force protection program at all levels of education and training. Following the Dhahran bombing, CINCCENT directed the following requirements for personnel assigned to the theater:

Personnel will receive training from their parent unit/command on the following topics: cultural aspects of the countries they will be working in, rules of engagement, antiterrorism measures for self-protection, biological weapons/chemical weapons personal protective measures, medical threat, and medical self-aid/buddy care. Training can be either classroom instruction or required reading prior to traveling to the AOR [area of responsibility].¹⁴

Although many units have incorporated antiterrorism training into their predeployment training, **more must be done!** CINCENT provides broad generic guidance yet, fails to establish higher training standards for forces operating within a theater under the highest threat of terrorism. **The U.S. military needs to move beyond classroom instruction and required reading lists to counter terrorism effectively.** The CJCS and the Service Chiefs must implement detailed programs of instruction incorporating the Downing Commission's recommendations into the curricula of all formal service schools for officers and enlisted personnel.

As a result of the Dhahran bombing and the Downing Commission's recommendation, the CJCS established a permanent office within the Joint Staff to deal with all matters pertaining to combatting terrorism.¹⁵ This endeavor fulfills the necessity for CJCS oversight, but does little for the direct support of operational forces. The CJCS needs to go a step further to provide adequate support for operational commanders. At present, there is no element within the U.S. military that operationally focuses on the various militant groups existing world wide. Under the U.S. Atlantic Command, a Joint Force Protection Center (JFPC) must be established as the single principle

organization for force protection at the operational level, the JFPC could convert concepts and doctrine into effective training for commanders and staffs.

A JFPC could perform several functions critical to achieving security for U.S. military personnel. With a regional orientation to support deployed forces, the JFPC could focus on gathering and disseminating various national intelligence collection efforts pertaining to the threat within an assigned area of operation. The JFPC could exploit technology to adapt and support force protection operations in various environments. The JFPC could facilitate timely inter-agency coordination and exchange of vital information with the Justice and State Departments, CIA, and the National Counter Terrorist Center to support operational commanders. More importantly, the establishment of the JFPC ensures that the passage of time or operational friction does not overshadow the lessons from Beirut and Dhahran.

The U.S. military must make fundamental changes in its approach to terrorism. Force protection measures and the threat from terrorism must be integrated in the daily functions and training of all units, as well as, deployments and operations. Terrorism scenarios must be incorporated into regular training and exercises. During contingency planning processes, the regional terrorist threat must be analyzed and briefed, incorporated within the operations order, and reemphasized by the commander in his intent. The negative impact of failure to take such measures was demonstrated in Dhahran. “Despite the risk to the airmen identified in the January 1996 Assessment, the rooms facing vulnerable exterior perimeter of Khobar Towers [Dhahran] remained occupied. Colonel Boyle stated that it would have adversely affected the quality of life at Khobar Towers had the Wing been forced to put two or three persons into each room of the interior buildings. Brigadier General Schwalier testified that he never thought of evacuating these rooms.”¹⁶ In short, focused training, education, and command emphasis will enhance the

military's awareness, and begin a transformation that underscores combat readiness and force protection over quality of life.

The CINCENT Operations Order on Force Protection, published three weeks after the Dhahran bombing, states "host nation police, security, and military forces in each country have primary responsibility for protection of our forces from civil disturbances and terrorist activities However, commanders have a fundamental duty to protect all personnel, facilities, and equipment under their command and control."¹⁷ Separating force protection responsibilities between the commander and the host nation confuses the order. **There must be no question in any commander's mind that the primary responsibility for force protection is the commander's and not the host country's.** To delegate this responsibility is inappropriate, especially in a theater where the threat is the greatest. We cannot totally depend on the loyalty, resolve, and proficiency of any host nation's security forces.

Host nation's security forces in the region are frequently lackadaisical and inept in their duties compared to U.S. standards and expectations.¹⁸ Moreover, an over-reliance on transnational workers to perform support functions on U.S. bases poses a potential serious threat. The unrestricted access these workers have to the messing and billeting facilities potentially allows for the introduction of a weapon of mass destruction in the form of a bacteria or chemical agent where forces congregate with catastrophic results.

Although tough to negotiate, when U.S. forces deploy or conduct operations in high threat regions, the force commander must operate under binding agreements with the host nations to ensure robust force protection measures. In Bosnia, the International Force (IFOR) commander operated successfully with such a mandate. "The IFOR commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any party to do all that the commander judges

necessary and proper, including the use of military force to protect the IFOR and to carry out its responsibilities¹⁹ The Downing Commission observed that in Kuwait, U.S. security forces were freely allowed to patrol outside the installations; whereas, in Saudi Arabia, U.S. security forces were not allowed outside the base. The truck that carried the deadly explosives in the Dhahran bombing exploded on the outside perimeter of the U.S. base. The presence of U.S. security forces on the exterior of the base might have been a more credible deterrence.

The Downing Commission noted that although installations had security officers appointed, some of these officers had received rudimentary antiterrorism training several years prior to their assignment to this position. The CJCS and the Service Chiefs must initiate a program to train and develop Force Protection Officers and permanently assign them to operational units. This officer must have a strong combat arms and unconventional warfare background supplemented by regional area expertise, experience in coordinating with federal and host nation agencies, and direct access to national intelligence sources through the proposed Joint Force Protection Center. Furthermore while deployed, he must control a dedicated, specialized unit for protection of the main force. The Downing Commission's observations and recommendations regarding the U.S. Marines Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST) must be seriously considered. "The U.S. Marine FAST security teams were the most impressive security forces observed in the theater. They are superbly trained, well-equipped, and well-led. They provide a useful model for development of service training programs."²⁰ In contrast to traditional military police units employed for static security, FAST units are trained in special weapons and tactics. They have the capability to conduct a variety of active and passive antiterrorist missions ranging from direct action, reinforcement, in-extremis hostage rescue,

surveillance, and security. A dedicated Force Protection Officer with a FAST type unit enhances an operational commander's ability to protect his main force for assigned missions.

Commanders must be aware that their actions may indirectly support the Islamic fundamentalist movement and employ forces that best support the mission. The December 1996 issue of the Department of Defense publication, Defense 96, "Force Protection: Hardening The Target," published photographs of three U.S. female Airmen guarding bases in Saudi Arabia. Although the role of women service members is accepted within the U.S. military, deploying women under the prevailing conditions to the Middle East causes U.S. cultural incursion, and reinforces the Islamic fundamentalist's rhetoric. Hence, using female service personnel as guards may not be prudent unless absolutely mission critical.

Through the proposed Force Protection Officer, commanders must develop a dialogue with local community leaders. This positive interaction may potentially build a cultural bridge that could alleviate problems and misunderstandings. While allowing the local community to voice its concerns, this exchange may also cultivate sources of local intelligence. By routinely appraising the cultural impact, the commander enhances his ability to reassess operations, and offer pertinent advice to strategic planners. More importantly, for operations of extended duration, it encourages a lasting bond between the people and U.S. forces that may mitigate a local threat.

DESIRED END STATE

The U.S. needs to define the scope of its presence in the Gulf. Undoubtedly, our long-term presence is essential. Yet, our ad hoc planning practices fail to consider the geopolitical nuances of permanently maintaining forces on the Arabian Peninsula. Force protection measures alone are only a deterrent. Commanders must organize forces that are the least vulnerable to the

threat of terrorism yet can accomplish the mission. Given the unique circumstances of the CINCCENT theater, the U.S. needs to employ adaptable forces that are suited for the operational, political, and cultural constraints of the region. In potentially risky and culturally sensitive operations such as Operation Southern Watch, the U.S. must reduce its operational footprint to the bare minimum through the maximum use of expeditionary forces strategically positioned at sea.

Naval Expeditionary Forces are capable of enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq. The sortie rate required in a temperate political climate is under one hundred sorties per day. This is significantly below the nominal sortie rate for a carrier air wing. By remaining afloat, expeditionary forces become difficult targets for terrorists and reduce the potential of cultural incursions. The host governments strengthen their positions politically by reducing U.S. presence within their borders, yet maintain their security by having U.S. forces at sea. As they have done so to date, these governments would continue to subsidize the cost of operations over Iraq incurred by the U.S.

Generally, only three of the eleven U.S. carriers are available at a given time for deployments. The current policy of tethering naval forces for a limited duration to the regional CINCs balances the available carriers to operational requirements in several theaters. By maintaining a carrier in direct support of CINCCENT, one of the three carriers would deploy to the CINCCENT's theater. The two remaining carriers would maintain forward presence in the Pacific Command Theater and the European Command Theater respectively.

To fill any gaps between carrier rotations in CINCENT's theater, U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Squadrons may be employed for limited duration. To minimize the operational and personnel tempo for carriers, commanders must be innovative in considering nontraditional use of

available assets to fulfill operational necessities. Employing U.S. Marine Corps squadrons aboard amphibious assault ships creates a medium size carrier similar to the ones the Royal British Navy successfully employed in the Falklands Campaign. Two AV8B Harrier Squadrons consisting of forty airplanes embarked upon a USS *WASP* (LHD-1) class ship can sustain one hundred sorties per day.

In light of the increasing threat from terrorism, and the rising sensitivities against U.S. bases overseas, the reliance on Naval Expeditionary Forces to maintain forward presence becomes greater. **It is therefore, operationally critical that the U.S. strategic planners employ and expand Naval Expeditionary Forces wisely.** CINCs must identify the importance of these type of forces as a high priority item on their Integrated Priorities Lists, which are submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the Middle East with its vast energy resources is of vital interest to all industrial and developing nations. The U.S. commitment to regional security and to protecting these vital interests fixates upon the emirs and the monarchs as a means to gain access to the resources. However, this strategy ignores the aspirations of the indigenous people for democratic institutions reflecting their culture and Islamic values. For the interim, this strategy is effective, but it fuels the Islamic fundamentalist movement. It becomes increasingly difficult and dangerous for military commanders to operate from an untenable position in such a complex environment. While the Western and Arab leaders formulate an acceptable strategy to abate militant Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. military commanders operating in theater must remain sensitive to the regional geopolitical issues and their linkage to Islamic fundamentalism.

The U.S. military needs to better organize for success by developing specialized units for the protection of the main force. Binding agreements with host nations that allow robust force protection measures must be sought to facilitate force protection operations. A Joint Force Protection Center that focuses on the threat and directly supports operational forces in force protection operations must be established. Force protection doctrine must be institutionalized through formal schools, training, and operations. In planning for and during operations, commanders must not underestimate the threat of terrorism by relying solely on superiority in doctrine, leadership, and weapons systems to secure vital national interests.

Force protection measures by themselves are only a deterrent. Commanders in planning and executing operations, must organize forces that are the least vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. Commanders must employ expeditionary forces in operations where the visibility of U.S. forces undermines host governments, promotes Islamic fundamentalism, and is detrimental to the long-term U.S. security commitments and objectives. By understanding the underlying issues, operational commanders can proffer incisive advice to strategic planners that focuses upon credible deterrence and employs forces that best protect our greatest asset--the American Fighting Men and Women.

ENDNOTES

¹ Wayne Downing, DOD News Briefing, (16 September 1996).

² The Downing Assessment Task Force Report, (August 1996), 5.

³ FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, "Terrorism In The United States: 1982-1992," (1993), 11.

⁴ Samuel Griffith, Sun Tzu The Art of War, (London: Oxford University Press 1963), 84.

⁵ Robert Famighetti, World Almanac and Book of Facts, (NJ: Funk & Wagnalls 1996), 647.

⁶ James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle East Terrorism," (1994), 3.

⁷ The Associated Press Release, Online. Internet. <<http://www.emout14.mx.aol.com>>, (27 November 1996).

⁸ General Binford Peay, "Combatting Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," Prepared Statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee, (9 July 1996).

⁹ Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, "Report To The President, The Protection Of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad," (15 September 1996).

¹⁰ Dilip Hiro, Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, (NY: Routledge 1989), 135.

¹¹ Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, "Combatting Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," Prepared Statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee, (9 July 1996).

¹² The Downing Assessment Task Force Report, Finding 20, (August 1996), 44.

¹³ The Downing Assessment Task Force Report, Finding 6, (August 1996), 21.

¹⁴ CINCENT Message dated 26 September 1996, "U.S.CINCENT Individual Protection and Deployment Policy for Unit Deployment and Individual Augmentation."

¹⁵ General John Shalikashvili, USA, CJCS, DOD News Briefing, (16 September 1996).

¹⁶ Ibid., Finding 20, 43.

¹⁷ CINCCENT Operations Order I-96, Force Protection, (14 July 1996).

¹⁸ The Author, Major Asad Khan, USMC, is a Foreign Area Officer for Southwest Asia. He has spent a considerable amount of time in the theater as a U.S. Marine Advisor to the Royal Saudi Marine Forces. These are professional observations.

¹⁹ David H. Hackworth, Hazardous Duty, (NY: William Morrow & Company 1996), 261.

²⁰ The Downing Assessment Task Force Report, Finding 5, (August 1996), 20.

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